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Parents in the labor force have balance their work and home life, including the choice of the 
type of care to provide for their children while they work. In this paper we study the 
connection between the married women's labor force participation, child care arrangements 
and the time that husbands and wives spent to take care of children in Mediterranean 
countries. As more women now are in the labor force the interest in the use child care and 
housework of husband have grown. We use the new database from the EU-SILC (European 
Survey on Income and Living Conditions) in 2006 and data from the ECHP (European 
Community Household Panel)in 2001, because these two data-set give us different 
information about child care and housework. The traditional role of mothers in child care 
activities is highly valued by many families, especially in Southern European countries. The 
results show that while Mediterranean countries have advanced in the incorporation of 
women into the labor market, most of them still have to assume total responsibility for 
housework and the care of the children. Child care arrangements is an important instrument 
for women to enter in paid employment. 
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 1 Introduction
Family structure and employment patterns have changed in Europe in the
last thirty years, so welfare states policies have also changed. European
countries have implemented new family policies with a strong eect on
parental employment patterns aiming to achieve dierent objectives such
as increasing the participation of mothers in the labour market and the fer-
tility rate, to create the possibility for women to access the labour market
on the same footing with men and promoting the equal division of unpaid
labour between men and women.
The dierent work-family arrangements across the member states are
based on historical and cultural dierences among countries. Esping{Andersen




The relationship between the labour market, the family and the welfare
state varies among countries.
Mediterranean countries were classied by Esping{Andersen in the sec-
ond type of welfare-state regimes. Women were primarily responsible for
unpaid work at home and the tradition family was central in this regime.
Child care and other unpaid work were unequally shared among partners,
even when mothers were employed on a full time basis in the labour market.
We focus our attention on these countries and study if there is a change in
this regime as for the welfare state in family policies, unpaid work at home
(including child care) and the labour market participation of married women
or there is still a conservative regime. Countries analyzed in this work are:
France, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece.
2The increase of the participation rate of women in the labour market has
implied one change in the traditional family. Their members have to decide
how the housework is to be distributed and who is to take care of children,
because the structure of the household where the wife does the housework
and takes care of the children, and the husband works outside to earn the
household income changed, even if partially.
The increased number of women in the labour force has made possible
not only an egalitarian distribution of the household work within the house-
hold but the interest in the use of non-parental child care has grown. The
intervention of governments that have subsidized child care programs in the
form of pre and after school programs, or the help of an informal arrange-
ments such as grandparents and professional child{minders, have enabled
women to participate in paid employment, because child care represents a
potential cost for the family. Decisions concerning the use of non-parental
child care depend on many economic and demographic factors, and the pro-
cess by which these decisions are made has implications for the eectiveness
of social policy concerning child care. Eorts to increase the supply of child
care must take into account the factors that parents demonstrate as impor-
tant in their choices of what child care to use.
In table 1 we present the maternal employment rate in 2005 with respect
to age and number of children in Europe. We can see that most mothers
are in paid work especially when they children go to school.
A large number of papers in the past years have studied the link between
women employment, child care cost and husbands' housework time. Bianchi
et al. (2000) studied how the propensity to do housework has increased dur-
ing 1965 and 1995. Coverman (1995) found that husband housework time
is correlated with wives' employment status. Alvarez-Miles (2006) investi-
gated the Spanish data to analyze the decision of women to enter in paid
employment.
The literature on and labour supply has focused on the eect of child care
costs. Heckman (1974), Blau and Robins (1988), Connelly (1992) among
3Table 1: Maternal employment rates, women age 15-64
Country by age of youngest child by number of children under 15
0-16 < 2 3-5 6-16 1 child 2 children 3 children
Belgium 59.9 63.8 63.3 56.9 58.3 58.5 39.4
Canada 70.5 58.7 68.1 71.1 70.1 73.2 66.3
Czech Republic 52.8 19.9 50.9 67.6 57.4 52.5 34.4
Denmark 76.5 71.4 77.8 77.5 .. .. ..
Finland 76.0 52.1 80.7 84.2 71.2 70.9 60.1
France 59.9 53.7 63.8 61.7 62.2 57.6 38.1
Germany 54.9 36.1 54.8 62.7 58.4 51.8 36.0
Greece 50.9 49.5 53.6 50.4 48.4 44.4 37.4
Hungary 45.7 13.9 49.9 58.3 53.7 48.3 24.6
Iceland 84.8 83.6 86.5 88.5 82.3
Ireland 57.5 55.0 59.9 55.4 52.5 42.3
Italy 48.1 47.3 50.6 47.5 48.3 41.0 27.4
Japan 52.4 28.5 47.8 68.1 .. .. ..
Luxembourg 55.4 58.3 58.7 52.7 56.0 49.8 33.8
Netherlands 69.2 69.4 68.3 69.4 70.1 70.6 59.9
New Zealand 64.6 45.1 60.6 75.3 64.1 64.5 56.7
Poland 46.4 .. .. .. 42.7 35.6 28.5
Portugal 67.8 69.1 71.8 65.4 63.5 59.2 46.1
Slovak Republic 48.4 23.1 46.6 60.4 56.4 49.4 31.5
Spain 52.0 52.6 54.2 50.9 51.1 44.7 38.5
Sweden 82.5 71.9 81.3 76.1 80.6 84.7 75.6
Switzerland 69.7 58.3 61.7 77.0 69.5 65.4 58.0
United Kingdom 61.7 52.6 58.3 67.7 67.1 62.4 42.3
United States 66.7 54.2 62.8 73.2 .. .. ..
EU-19 59.5 51.1 58.2 63.2 59.4 55.2 41.2
OECD average 61.5 51.7 61.2 66.1 60.2 56.9 43.8
Data source: Eurostat, 2005
others found that female labour participation is signicantly in
uenced by
child-care policies in the U.S and UK.
A very limited number of works have investigated which eect have child
care arrangements and husbands' housework on employment of wives in
particular for Mediterranean countries where family traditions have changed
dramatically in this last decade.
It once was dicult to nd data on arrangements in Europe, but with
the new data set of EU-SILC (European Income and Living Conditions) we
have this information. To do the cross-section analysis we use the 2001 wave
from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) and the EU-SILC
in 2006.
In this contest the objectives of the paper are threefold. First, to study
the household model in Southern European countries, how the members of a
family share the housework and how they take care of children, has changed
something in these countries or continue to be a conservative welfare regime.
Second, how non-parental arrangements are used by the household. We dis-
tinguish two types of arrangements: paid care (day centre care, professional
child-minders and centre-based services) and unpaid care (grandparents and
4others household members). Finally, we investigate how child care arrange-
ments aect the participation equation of married women in the labour
market. Mediterranean labour and child care market are very rigidity and
in
exible where take the decision for the mothers to enter in the labour
market and to use child care is very complicated.
The paper is organized as follows: in section I we present summery
statistics and analysis of child care arrangement and hours spent in take
care of children. In section II we estimate a probit model to carry out
the characteristics that determine the time dedicated to caring for children,
and in section III we estimate the impact of child care arrangements on
employment status of married female and conclusions.
2 Sample Characteristics and Data
The data set used is drawn from the European Community Household Panel
(ECHP) and EU-SILC (European Income and Living Conditions).
The ECHP data set is a multi-country annual longitudinal survey of
collected data since 1994 1 in 15 European Union Member States under Eu-
rostat (Statistical Oce of the European Communities) coordination.
The data set covers approximately 130,000 individuals from 60,000 house-
holds in the fteen countries which were EU members in 2000, re
ecting
population changes over time through a continuous evolution of the sample.
The panel data cover a wide range of subjects such as demographics, labour
force behavior, income, health, education and training, housing, poverty and
social exclusion, etc.
The ECHP is being progressively replaced with data collection under
the EU-SILC regulations (no.1177/2003 Community Statistics on collection
under the EU-SILC regulations on Income and Living Conditions). Seven
countries launched a preliminary version of the EU-SILC in 2003. The
project was formally launched in 2004 and EU25 coverage is expected with
1Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, the U.K., Denmark, France, Greece, Ireland,
Portugal, Italy and Spain started in 1994 (wave 1), Austria joined in 1995 (wave 2),
Finland joined in 1996 (wave 3).
5eect from 2005 2. The regulations will be fully applicable from 2007. EU-
SILC is expected to become the reference source of statistics on income and
social exclusion in the European Union.
The European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-
SILC) aims to collect timely and comparable cross-sectional and longitudinal
multidimensional microdata on income, poverty, social exclusion and living
conditions.
The EU-SILC aims to provide two types of data:
- Cross-sectional data pertaining to a given time or a certain time pe-
riod with variables on income, poverty, social exclusion and other living
conditions .
- Longitudinal data pertaining to individual-level changes over time, ob-
served periodically over, typically, a four year period.
Social exclusion and housing condition information is collected at house-
hold level while labour, education and health information is obtained for
people aged 16 and over. The core of the study, income at a very detailed
component level, is mainly collected at personal level but a few components
are included in the household part of SILC.
The sample has been constructed by matching the couple of wives with
their respective husbands. We have selected all t wives who are in working
age and we have excluded self employed women. The size of the sample
varies across countries and across years.
First, we look at the percentage of households by reference to the spouses'
relationships with the labour market. Figure 1 relates to the employment
patterns of husbands and wives in 2001 and 2006 elaborated respectively
with ECHP and EU-SILC data. We can see how the part-time employment
is very low for husbands in these years, while for wives it has increased and
France is the country with a major number of women in a part-time job.
In table 3 and 4 we report for each country the husbands' and wives'
relationships with the labour market in 2006 estimated with the EU{SILC
2The EU-SILC was launched in 2004 in 13 Member States :BE, DK, EE, EL, ES, FR,
IE, IT, LU, AT, PT, FI and SE and in NO and IS
6Figure 1: Employment patterns by full-time and part-time for hus-
bands and wives
7data set and in 2001 estimated with the ECHP data.
Regarding husbands that work at home, the data show that it is very
rare to nd men at home, just Italy and Spain have a few husbands in this
situation in the EU-SILC data while in Greece and Portugal we continue to
nd no husbands who spent time in this job in 2006.
Women's housework decreased in 2006 with respect to 2001 around 10%
in all countries and about 20% in Greece. The unemployment rate aects
women more than men and it decrease in general, while the employment rate
increased in 2006 and we nd a dierence between husbands and wives, with
a dierence of 40% of participation in the labour market for Greece, Italy
and Spain and about 20% for Portugal and France. These tables show that
the family behavior has changed, but the results are more clear in tables 5
and gures 2 to 4 where we look at the time spent by wives and husbands
taking care of children in 2001 with ECHP data and the time that children
spent in non parental when they are (pre-after) school hours outside with
EU-SILC data in 2006. 3.
In table 5 we present data on how husband and wife shared the time
that dedicated to care of the children and the time that they spent on child
care in 2001. We can rst note that such care is distributed between both
spouses unequally in all countries. 70% of wives spend time on this task in
Mediterranean countries and 50% of husbands, but when the wives do not
take care of children only 0.50%{1% of their partners do. Women dedicated
much more time to child care, we nd that 88% of women in Spain spent
more than 28 hours for children while only 45% of men spent 28 hours. We
don't nd striking dierences across countries except for France where a
higher percentage of husbands take care of children although the time spent
with children is less for both spouses.
3In the data set EU-SILC, we don't have the variable that indicate the number of
hours that the members of the household spent taking care of children, but the number of
hours that the children spent outside the home such as in care organised/controlled by a
structure (public, private), direct arrangements between the carer and the parents, unpaid
care (free or informal arrangements such as exchange of services) as grand-parents, others
household members (outside parents) and centre-based services outside (pre-)school hours
8We show the results of the EU-SILC data in gure 2, 3 and 4 and table
2 where we report the weekly hours that children with age between 0 and
13 spent in arrangements such as institutions, with professional babysitters
or using informal care and the distribution of child care arrangements for
each Mediterranean country. Preschoolers and grade school-aged children
required dierent types of care.
The child care system is organized dierently across countries, in table 2
we report the average of hours that children spent in a week in dierent types
of care. We have Child care at centre-based services, that concerns only the
children who are at pre-school or at school if the child care reference time is
outside (pre{)school hours. Child care at day-care centre includes all kinds
of care organised/controlled by a structure (public or private). Child care
by a professional child-minders where the arrangements are direct between
the care provider and the parents: parents are often employers and pay
the care provider directly. Unpaid care are free or informal arrangements
such as exchange of services (neighbor, friends, grandparents etc.) Unpaid
care is used in all countries. Greece and Italy are the countries where the
percentage of the children in the unpaid care is highest (73.25% and 54.91%)
and where the children spent by average 20 hours per week in Greece and 15
hours in Italy. France and Portugal have a high number of children in day-
centre care, where children spend time during pre and after school hours,
while Spain and Greece do not use this type of child care a lot. Professional
child-minders are an option that parents use and where children stay a long
time except in Portugal and Italy where the hours are around 8 per week.
If we look at graphs 2-4 we nd that the distribution of the age of children
with respect to hours spent in non parental child care arrangements varies
across countries and decreases with age. We can see that the period between
0 and 6 years is a critical age, since children require more hours of care.
When children are older than 10 the number of hours spent in child care is
less. In Italy and Spain non parental child care arrangements used less than
in other countries in each age cohort, while in Portugal we nd that a great
9percentage of the children in the middle, 3{10 years old, receive care away
from their parents.
We can conclude that the time that children spent without parents is
not very high especially for Italy and Spain and in particular when children
are in grade school.
In the following gure 5, we present the child care arrangements by
mother's working status. Grandparents play an important role as primary
child care especially when the mother is employed. In Portugal and France
almost 90% of women work outside the home while in the rest of countries
surprisingly a 10% of women work at home and use child care. Children
are care by the day-centre care or by the centre-based services while women
work at home or are unemployed in Italy, Greece and Spain. The percentage
of women who have a paid job is very high when they use the professional
child-minders services , maybe because this kind of arrangements is very
expensive and located in large cities where people's living standard is high
and so the mother often has a high salary.
This eect is conrmed if we look at graph 6 where we take in consider-
ation the households income by child care arrangements. The mean income
of household using professional child-minders is high in all countries, while
is low when parents use unpaid care, except for Portugal which has the same
distribution of household income across dierent types of child care.
For many families, however, there are additional arrangements made for
child care. We have calculated the number of types of non parental child
care used by parents in Mediterranean countries and the results are reported
in graph 7. In Spain, Portugal and Greece a 90% of households only use one
kind of non parental child care while France and Italy more than 25% use
also another second kind of non parental child care.
10Figure 2: Distribution of the number of hours spent in a week in
child care arrangements: EU-SILC 2006
11Figure 3: Distribution of the number of hours spent in a week in
child care arrangements: EU-SILC 2006














Spain 5.21 14.89 18.26 16.21
30.24 9.41 15.12 45.24
France 5.68 21.44 18.43 12.18
27.75 24.49 17.18 30.57
Greece 11.39 12.33 25.21 24.49
17.74 0.43 8.58 73.25
Italy 5.81 4.28 10.02 14.43
21.56 16.86 6.65 54.91
Portugal 12.01 36.5 24.44 21.14
41.52 14.84 7.95 35.69
Figure 4: Distribution of the number of hours spent in a week in
child care arrangements: EU-SILC 2006
13Figure 5: Child care Arrangements by Mother's Working Status
14Figure 6: Household Income by Child care Arrangements
Figure 7: Number of Child care Arrangements Used: EU-SILC
2006
153 Theoretical Model of Employment Decision and
Child Care
Our propose is to study the impact of child care on women's employment
decision. We focus our attention on the maximization of utility function
that mothers do when they decide to enter in the labour market. We do not
present a formal theoretical model of child care and employment but follow
a simple microeconomic model of time allocation. The total time (K) that
mothers have is xed and limited and is allocated in two uses: work (H),
that is repay at a xed wage w and leisure (L).
K = L + H
Hours of labor are chosen to maximize an utility function that depends on
leisure and consumption, C, subject to a budget constraint that is composed
by no labor income W and wage rate w. A part of the mother's leisure is
used to take care of children if they are present in a family. The children
could also receive care from market(paid) and no-market (unpaid) systems.
Hours that children spend in paid care are denoted as F and hours spend in
unpaid care are denoted as I. Let L;F;I represent the productivities of
maternal care, market care and no-market care respectively. The total care
that the child i receive can be expressed as:
Qi = TLi + FF + II
Paid child care has a price (p) measured as a percentage of consumption
goods (C) and it also has to be incorporated into budget constraint. In our
data we do not know this price p, but only the hours that children are cared
away from their parents. The budget constraint in a family is given by:
C = W + wH   pF
16We don't know this p and the price of unpaid care is equal to zero. The
income of other components of the family is included in W and considerated
as exogenous, so we can rewrite the budget as:
C = W + wH
The household utility function can be maximized as:
max(H;F;I)U = U(LK   H + FF + II;K   H)
The solution of this maximization problems conduct to rst order con-
ditions that resume the relationship among the choice variable : H, F and I








Where W is the wage, X is a vector of observed characteristics, and
;
, and  represent unobserved terms normally distributed. As we have
commented before, we do not take in consideration the cost of child care
because we do not have this information in our data-set, of course the family
utility depends also on the price of paid child care but we must omit this
part.
The decisions to enter the labour force H and use child care (F, I) are
interrelated. Our approach models child care decision as conditional on
the women's labour force participation using a multivariate selection model,
17where we estimate jointly the choices of child care and labor supply with
the following model:
y1 = 1(y2 + x11 + "1 > 0)
y2 = 1(x22 + "2 > 0);
y3 = 1(x33 + "3 > 0);
("1;"2"3 j x1;x2;x3)  N(0;1;);
(1)
where 1(:) is the indicator function taking the value one if the state-
ment between brackets is true and zero otherwise. 1 and 2 are regression
coecients, and indicate the standard bivariate normal distribution with
correlation coecients. When  is zero, the model for y1 reduce to the
standard probit model. Consistent and asymptotically ecient parameter
estimates are obtained by maximum likelihood estimation of multi-equation,
conditional recursive mixed process estimators. "Mixed process" means that
dierent equations can have dierent kinds of dependent variables. This is
based on a likelihood function consisting of a product of individual contri-
butions of the type:
Li(;1;2;3 j y1i;y2i;y3i;x1i;x2i;x3i) =
= P(y1i;y2i;y3i j x1i;x2i;x3i)
(2)
The participation equation is estimated with a probit model and can be
written as:
H = W + Xit +  (3)
H = 1 if H > 0 (4)
where H, is a dummy variable that takes 1 if the woman participates
in the labour market (working or seeking work) and 0 if she doesn't. We
excluded self-employed married women. The decision to participate depends
on a vector of explanatory variables Xit such as age, education level, hourly
18wage, household income without wife's earnings, household size, education
of husbands, if the husband are unemployed or not, urbanization of area,
having or not children with dierent level of age and type of child care:
paid and unpaid. Wages of mothers are observed only if they are in the job
market.
The equation of paid child care (F) depends on the age of children,
utilization of unpaid care, hourly wages, family income, while the equation
of unpaid child care (I) is estimated on the age of children, wages, family
income and utilization of paid care.
Conditional on the mother's employment(working or not), the two equa-
tions of child care (paid and unpaid) are estimated as a joint Tobit model. In
total, the model contains ve states. First we have the state where women
decide not o enter in the labour market, and after other four states if they
decide to enter. The four combinations are: {1{ utilize both paid and un-
paid care, {2,3{ utilize only one of type of care (paid or unpaid) and {4{
utilize no care.
4 Time Dedicated to Taking Care of Children and
the Type of non Parental Child Care Arrange-
ments Used
First, we estimate the probability for husbands and wives to take care of
children with a probit model on the data set from the ECHP in the year
2001. Second using the wave of 2006 of the EU-SILC data we calculate with a
multinomial logit the probability of using one type of child care arrangement
with respect to the others.
In the probit model we calculate Pit, which denotes the probability that
an individual i takes care of children in the period t.
y
it = 0xit + "i (5)
In practice, y
it is unobservable if :
yi = 1 if y
it > 0 and yi = 0 if y
i  0 (6)
19"i(0;1)
where xt is a vector of individual characteristics at age t , and  is a row
vector of coecients. For the probit model we assume "i follows a standard
normal distribution. The corresponding density and distribution function
of the normal are given by:
f(w) = (w) (7)
P(w < w) = F(w) = (w) (8)
where this last equation is the cumulative value of the normal distribu-
tion. We utilize a simple specication of the labour supply function focusing
on demographic characteristics. The probit model is estimated for husbands
and wives using the ECHP data. The vector of individual characteristics
xti at time t contains the following variables: age in three dierent age
cohorts; dummy variables for three dierent level of education: primary
school, secondary school and tertiary school; the status of employment (at
work, unemployed and housework or inactive) and variables for the spouse:
level of education and employment status. Finally we used variables at the
level of the household such as the logarithm of the household income without
the partner's earnings and the household size.
In table 6 we report the marginal eects of the probit estimation of
positive time dedicated to taking care of children using the ECHP survey in
2001 for the selected countries.
We can note that husbands and wives's decision is in
uenced by age in
all countries. We nd that the probability to take care of children decreases
with age, although husbands and wives presented an inverted U-shape in
France and Spain, the probability rst increases with the age then in a
middle age decreases. This probability increases also when the education
level of women decreases and the education level of men increases except for
French wives. If we look at the employment status, the results suggest that
the probability of taking care of children increases if the wife or the husband
20work at home and decreases when spouses are at home. Of course we nd
a correlation between taking care of children and employment status, but
in this case we only want to describe the pattern and not address casuality.
Income has a positive eect for husbands in Italy, Portugal and for French
and Portuguese wives, while for the rest of countries the eect is negative.
The household size has a positive and signicant eect on the time spent
with children for both partners. So we noted that wives who dedicate a
lower number of hours in the labour market are able to dedicate more time
to taking care of children. These results are in accordance with other papers
dedicated to this topic, for example in Spain with Garcia - Molina (1998)
and in Italy with Del Boca (2002).
With the EU-SILC data in the year 2006 we rst calculated the proba-
bility for children to use a kind of non parental child care arrangement. To
calculate this probability we use a multinomial logit model.
The multinomial logit model is a logistic regression where the response
variables are more than two categories, it is a multiequation model where
the individual i choose alternative j to maximize the utility function:
Uij = max(Ui1;Ui2;:::::::;Uij)
where the utility depends on some individual characteristics Xi:
Uij = jXi + "ij
and the probability is:
Pr(alternative j) = Pr(Uij > Uik 8j 6= k)
The results are showed in table 7, where the dependent variable takes
four values corresponding to the types of child care. We have selected un-
paid child care as the base category, that is, the comparison group. As
explanatory variables we use the characteristics of the father and mother
such as: education and age, the income of the family, the age of children
and the grade of urbanization.
21The age of children decreases the probability to use professional child-
minders in all countries except in Italy where the value is not statically
signicant, and increases the probability to choose centre-based services.
The education level of mothers and fathers and household income increases
the probability to chose professional child-minders while the probability to
choose the center-based services and day-centre care decreases, except in
France for the day-centre care. The degree of urbanization allows that par-
ents choose day-centre care and based-service with respect to informal care.
This analysis also re
ects the quality of child care that is oered on the
market and the level of trust that parents have in these types of child care
arrangements. More income and more level of education encourage parents
to use professional child care more than informal care.
5 Results
In this part of the paper we estimate the eects of non parental child care
on the employment status of women (and vice versa) and the opportunity
cost of the time dedicated by the household to taking care of children. The
participation equation is expressed as a probit while the hours of paid and
unpaid care utilization are estimated with a Tobit model. All three equations
are estimated simultaneously using a method of maximum likelihood. We
present two results of the join of employment status and care utilization.
The rst model is an estimation of the probit participation of women joint
with child care arrangements, paid and unpaid. In the second model results
take in consideration also the hourly wage. We report only results for Italy4.
Table 8 contains the joint estimation of the three equation models. The
rst column reports the estimation of the participation of married women in
the labour market. Age of women and their education tend to increase the
probability to work, as well as the education of the husband. These results
also indicate that if wives have children they are not able to work, especially
when children are less than 6 years old. Income has a positive eect on this
4Other countries results are available on request to the author.
22probability such as if the husband does not work and the metropolitan area.
The second column in table 8 show the coecients of hours that children
spent in paid child care. The age of mothers and the education of both
parents have a positive and signicant eect on the utilization of this kind
of child care arrangement.
The age of children has a negative eect, especially when children are
very young. This could depend on various factors: the scarce presence of
child care system in Italy for children with age less than three, children
with 0-3 years are more likely to be cared from informal care and another
factor may be the high level of tradition in families present in this country.
Husbands that stay at home because are unemployed, reduce number of
hours of paid care utilization.
The last column is the estimation of the utilization of unpaid care. Age
and education of mother and education of fathers increase the number of
hours that children spend in child care . Young children are estimated to
have a positive and strong eect on unpaid care. The utilization of un-
paid care decreases when children are more independent. Numerous family
discourage the utilization of unpaid care such as an husband with an unem-
ployment status.
In Table 9 we insert in the simultaneous equations model the prediction
of hourly wage. The mother's wage is observed only for those who work,
so we need to correct the selection bias, estimating rst the participation
equation to calculate the inverse Mill's ratio () and after calc ulating the
prediction of the correct wage equation using the  (see Heckman 1973).
The wage has a positive eect in the use of child care arrangement and in
the participation to the job market.
The age is positive and signicant in all three equations, while its square
is negative. The level of education increases, which makes women more likely
to work and to use paid and unpaid child care. The presence of children
increases the probability to use unpaid child care with respect to paid child
care and at the same time it reduces the probability of working. Also the
23house size decreases this probability. The positive sign of no labor income
is associated with an increment of the probability to enter in the job market
for women, while paid and unpaid child care are considerated as normal
goods. The hourly wage of husband in one side decreases the probability
for women to enter in the job market and in the other side increases hours
utilization of child care arrangements.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have studied the relationship between women's employment
status and child care arrangements, and the time that parents spend with
children in Mediterranean countries. The results show that while Mediter-
ranean countries have advanced in the incorporation of women into the
labour market, most of them continue to assume total responsibility for
housework and most responsibility for the care of the children.
We observe how the probability to take care of children increases with
the age and if one of partner is unemployed, and decreases with the age of
children and parents level of education. Normally in the house women are
responsible for this task.
To have a child care arrangement and in particular grandparents who
help taking care of children is correlated with having more time to partici-
pate in the labour market, but in countries such as Italy, Spain and Greece
children spent few hours in paid child care. A surprisingly high percentage
of women in these countries stay at home and use non-parental child care ar-
rangements. We have two opposite conclusions concerning these countries:
on one hand women are discouraged to use child care in these countries
maybe due to a strong family tradition where the woman is the milestone in
the house and on the other hand women do not want to enter in the labour
market not because children are an obstruction but because other reasons
prevail.
Women's labour supply and child care arrangements are in
uenced by
a change in the wage rate. The results indicate that hourly wages have
24a strong eect on the decision to work and to use paid and unpaid child
care. Policies that increase the eective wage rate, such as benets for poor
families or less penalization in terms of taxation for married women are
likely to have a signicant eect on employment status.
The rate of married women that work at home is very high in Mediter-
ranean countries. New solutions to involve women in the labour market are
needed.
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30Table 5: Distribution between couple of the numbers of hours and
is they take care of the children: ECHP 2001
Greece Husbands Wives
Wives < 14 14-28 > 28 Total
< 14 2.02 0.51 0 2.53 Husbands Yes No Total
14-28 11.62 6.57 0 18.18 Yes 41.11 0.58 41.7
> 28 17.68 45.96 15.66 79.29 No 35.89 22.42 58.3
Total 31.31 53.03 15.66 100 Total 77 23 100
Spain Husbands Wives
Wives < 14 14-28 > 28 Total
< 14 2.71 1.08 0.27 4.07 Husbands Yes No Total
14-28 2.98 2.98 1.36 7.32 Yes 50.34 0.75 51.09
> 28 11.65 33.88 43.09 88.62 No 25.7 23.21 48.91
Total 17.34 37.94 44.72 100 Total 76.04 23.96 100
Italy Husbands Wives
Wives < 14 14-28 > 28 Total
< 14 3.75 0.34 0.17 4.26 Husbands Yes No Total
14-28 12.1 7.67 0.51 20.27 Yes 37.16 1.98 39.14
> 28 19.25 35.95 20.27 75.47 No 32.3 28.56 60.86
Total 35.09 43.95 20.95 100 Total 69.46 30.54 100
France Husbands
Wives < 14 14-28 > 28 Total Wives
< 14 6.59 0.6 0.6 7.78 Husbands Yes No Total
14-28 13.77 11.98 0 25.75 Yes 63.96 1.16 65.12
> 28 16.17 26.95 23.35 66.47 No 14.4 20.48 34.88
Total 36.53 39.52 23.95 100 Total 78.36 21.64 100
Portugal Husbands
Wives < 14 14-28 > 28 Total Wives
< 14 6.59 0.6 0.6 7.78 Husbands Yes No Total
14-28 13.77 11.98 0 25.75 Yes 59.15 0.54 59.69
> 28 16.17 26.95 23.35 66.47 No 27.1 13.2 40.31





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































33Table 8: Joint Estimation of Child Care and Participation of










Age 0.10*** 4.37*** 6.65***
-0.02 -0.45 -0.67
Age squared -0.01*** -0.63*** -1.07***
0 -0.06 -0.09
Second. Edu. 0.07* 1.97*** 1.96*
-0.03 -0.56 -0.91
Tertiary Edu. 0.12** 3.49*** 4.18***
-0.04 -0.7 -1.13
Second Edu. Husban. 0.45*** 1.51** 5.67***
-0.03 -0.57 -0.94
Tertiary Edu. Husban. 1.01*** 4.92*** 10.60***
-0.04 -0.68 -1.13
Income 0.05** 0.6 1.07
-0.02 -0.37 -0.6
Child. Age 0-3 0.03 -7.86*** 9.05***
-0.05 -0.97 -1.2
Child. Age 4-6 0.06 -0.36 8.93***
-0.04 -0.67 -1.04
Unemp of Husband 0.30*** -0.2 -4.68*
-0.07 -1.35 -2.38
House Size -0.15*** -0.49 -1.51***
-0.01 -0.26 -0.43










Note: p .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *;
34Table 9: Joint Estimation of Child Care and Participation of










Age 0.55* 3.71*** 5.79***
0.24 -0.52 -0.73
Age squared -0.06* -0.57*** -1.02***
-0.03 -0.07 -0.1
Hourly wage 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.46***
-0.02 -0.03 -0.05
Second. Edu. -0.6 2.38*** 0.85
-0.33 -0.63 -0.91
Tertiary Edu. -0.16** 3.65*** 3.15**
-0.41 -0.78 -1.12
Second Edu. Husban. -0.53*** -2.84** -6.80***
-0.59 -1.05 -1.58
Tertiary Edu. Husban. -0.13*** -3 -15.52***
-0.97 -1.73 -2.65
Income 1.39*** 0.02 0.66
-0.26 -0.5 -0.75
Child. Age 0-3 -0.1 -7.69*** 7.90***
-0.54 -1.04 -1.18
Child. Age 4-6 -0.53 -0.18 7.29***
-0.45 -0.74 -1.03
Hourly wage Husban. -0.01*** 0.01 0.02
0 0 -0.01
House Size -0.86*** 0.08 -0.64
-0.17 -0.3 -0.44










Note: p .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *;
35